Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games

François Durand, Antonin Macé and Matias Nuñez
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François Durand: Nokia Bell Labs [Espoo], LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - SU - Sorbonne Université

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Abstract: We analyze Approval Voting in Poisson games endowing voters with private values over three candidates. We firsts how that any stable equilibrium is discriminatory: one candidate is commonly regarded as out of contention. We fully characterize stable equilibria and divide them into two classes. In direct equilibria, best responses depend only on ordinal preferences. In indirect equilibria, preference intensities matter. Counter-intuitively, any stable equilibrium violates the ordering conditions, a set of belief restrictions used to derive early results in the literature. We finally use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the prevalence of the different sorts of equilibria and their likelihood to elect a Condorcet winner.

Keywords: Approval voting; Poisson games; Stable equilibria; Monte-Carlo simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cmp, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02049865v1
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Working Paper: Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games (2019)
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