The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence

Fabio Galeotti, Maria Montero and Anders Poulsen ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The Attraction Effect and Compromise Effect (AE and CE) were introduced for individual choice situations. We define and experimentally investigate the AE and CE for bargaining situations. Our data suggest that the AE and CE are significant in bargaining, when certain conditions, related to focal equilibrium selection criteria based on payoff equality, efficiency, and symmetry, are met.

Keywords: Bargaining; attraction effect; compromise effect; focality; equality; efficiency; symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02466032v1
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (2022)
Working Paper: The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (2022)
Working Paper: The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (2018)
Working Paper: The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (2017)
Working Paper: The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence (2017)
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