Ethical Voting in Heterogenous Groups

Alberto Grillo ()
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Alberto Grillo: AMU - Aix Marseille Université, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Voting in large elections appears to be both ethically motivated and influenced by strategic considerations. One way to capture this interplay postulates a rule-utilitarian calculus, which abstracts away from voters' heterogeneity in the intensity of support (Feddersen and Sandroni 2006, Coate and Conlin 2004). I argue that this approach is limited when such heterogeneity is considered, because it implies that the intensity of preferences is irrelevant for participation, in contrast to the empirical evidence. I compare the rule-utilitarian framework with a different model of ethical voting, in which agents maximize their individual utility under a moral constraint given by a universalization principle. Such a model predicts instead higher turnout rates among voters with higher intensity of support, thus linking ethical motivation to the spatial theory of voting.

Keywords: Voting; Turnout; Ethical Voter; Rule-utilitarian; Kantian Optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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