The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating

Julien Benistant (), Fabio Galeotti and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Julien Benistant: ISC-MJ - Institut des sciences cognitives Marc Jeannerod - Centre de neuroscience cognitive - UMR5229 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Marie Claire Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task where players can repeatedly misreport the outcomes of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under a noncompetitive piece rate scheme or in a two-player competitive tournament. In this dynamic setting we test (i) whether giving continuous feedback (vs. final ex post feedback) on the opponent's reported outcome to both players encourages cheating behavior, and (ii) to what extent this influence depends on the incentive scheme in use (piece rate vs. tournament). We also vary whether the opponent is able to cheat or not. We find that people lie more when placed in a competitive rather than a non-competitive setting, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart's reports increases cheating under the piece-rate scheme but not in a competitive setting. Our results provide new insights on the role that feedback plays on cheating behavior in dynamic settings under different payment schemes, and shed liht on the origins of the effect of competition on dishonesty.

Keywords: Dishonesty; feedback; peer effects; competitive incentives; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03110295v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating (2021)
Working Paper: The Distinct Impact of Information and Incentives on Cheating (2021)
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