Allocation Rules for Multi-choice Games with a Permission Tree Structure

David Lowing

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We consider multi-choice cooperative games with a permission tree structure. Multi-choice games are a generalization of a cooperative transferable utility games in which each player has several activity levels. In addition, a permission tree structure models a situation in which a player needs permission from another player to cooperate. In this framework, the influence of a permission structure on the possibility of cooperation may have several interpretations depending on the context. In this paper, we investigate several of these interpretations and introduce for each of them a new allocation rule that we axiomatically characterize.

Keywords: Multi-choice games; Multi-choice Permission value; Permission (tree) structures Multi-choice games; Permission (tree) structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03121514v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure (2023)
Working Paper: Allocation Rules for Multi-choice Games with a Permission Tree Structure (2021)
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