SPLITTING NUCLEAR PARKS OR NOT? THE THIRD PARTY LIABILITY ROLE

Gerard Mondello

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: Starting from the standard analysis of accident theory, this paper shows that determining the first-best level of care of ultra-hazardous activities also involves determining the best industrial structure. The analysis assesses the impact of the civil nuclear liability on the organization of given electro-nuclear parks. The object is to know whether these liability rules induce horizontally concentrating the management of nuclear industry or not. In a model extended from two to n plants, we show that the institutional conditions (cap on the operator's liability and the insurance compensation) play a fundamental role in the inducement to centralize or not this management. Hence, a priori, no organization framework is more efficient than the other one.

Date: 2021-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-rmg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03502601
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Related works:
Journal Article: Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third party liability role (2015)
Working Paper: Splitting nuclear parks or not? The third party liability role (2015)
Working Paper: Splitting Nuclear Parks or Not? The Third Party Liability Role (2014)
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