UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION SOURCES' RELIABILITY

Gerard Mondello

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of the reliability of information sources on choices under ambiguity. Using the Ellsberg's (1961) framework it studies two conjectures. First, the conditions of appearance of the Ellsberg paradox when the information source offers two probable proportions of red and black balls in two urns. Second, the consequence on choices of a non-reliable information source. This source proposes a unique proportion of red and black balls against an unknown one (inside box 1).

Keywords: Uncertainty theory; decision theory; ambiguity aversion; Information I1; I18; I19; D80; D81; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-his, nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03502603
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Working Paper: Uncertainty and Information Sources' Reliability (2021)
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