Tort Law under Oligopolistic Competition

Gerard Mondello and Evens Salies

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This article extends the unilateral accident standard model to allow for Cournot competition. Assuming risk-neutrality for the regulator and injurers, it analyzes three liability regimes: strict liability, negligence rule, and strict liability with administrative authorization or permits systems. Under competition the equivalence between negligence rule and strict liability no longer holds, and negligence insures a better level of social care. However, enforcing both a permit system and strict liability restores equivalence between liability regimes. However, whatever the current regime, competition leads to lower the global safety level of industry.

Keywords: Tort Law; Strict Liability; Negligence rule; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly; Cournot Competition. JEL: D43; L13; L52; K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-his and nep-law
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03502604
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Related works:
Working Paper: Tort Law under Oligopolistic Competition (2016)
Working Paper: Tort law under oligopolistic competition (2016)
Working Paper: Tort law under oligopolistic competition (2016)
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