Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility

Francisco Cabo and Mabel Tidball ()
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Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro

Abstract: We analyze a dynamic environmental agreement between two regions. We assume that the agreement is jointly protable, because the eort associated with emission reductions is overcompensated by a cleaner environment in the future The two regions are asymmetric in two respects: their value of a cleaner environment is dierent, and they are responsible for the initial environmental problem in dierent ways. Because the benets of a cleaner environment cannot be transferred, we propose a mechanism on how to share the eorts of lowering current emissions, satisfying two main properties. The rst property is a benets pay principle: the greater one region's relative benet from cooperation, the greater must be its relative contribution. The second property is, a polluter pay principle: a region's relative contribution increases with its responsibility. Moreover, the sharing scheme must be time consistent. At any intermediate time, no country can do better by deviating from cooperation.*

Keywords: Cooperative dierential game; Distribution procedure; Time consistency; Polluter pay principle; Benets pay principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02462071v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation in a Dynamic Setting with Asymmetric Environmental Valuation and Responsibility (2022)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility (2022)
Working Paper: Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility (2020)
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