Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict

Guillaume Cheikbossian

CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro

Abstract: We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely group members are altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution.

Keywords: Indirect evolutionary approach; Evolutionary stability; Groups; Altruism; Conflicts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hme and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02291876v1
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Working Paper: Evolutionarily stable in-group altruismin intergroup conflict (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpceem:halshs-02291876

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