Optimal Syndication Decision of Corporate Venture Capital and Venture Capital Firms

Andreas Frick and Hannes Maxin ()

Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät

Abstract: Venture capital and corporate venture capital firms are driven by high financial returns through the sale of ownership stakes. Additionally, corporate venture capital firms maximize the profits of their parent companies by generating innovation advantage. Despite this, both intermediaries can join syndicates to obtain more information about their potential investments. We examine a model to show the differences between the syndication decisions of these two investor types. We find that corporate venture capital firms finance more projects without a syndicate in comparison with venture capital firms. To reinforce our theoretical results, we conduct a survey about the German private equity market. The empirical evidence support our main theoretical findings.

Keywords: Corporate venture capital; Venture capital; Syndication; Screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-cse, nep-ent and nep-ino
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://diskussionspapiere.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/pdf_bib/dp-577.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-577

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) from Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Heidrich, Christian ().