Stochastic Bankruptcy Games
Helga Habis and
P. Jean-Jacques Herings
No 1205, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
Abstract:
We study bankruptcy games where the estate and the claims have stochastic values. We use the Weak Sequential Core as the solution concept for such games.We test the stability of a number of well known division rules in this stochastic setting and find that most of them are unstable, except for the Constrained Equal Awards rule, which is the only one belonging to the Weak Sequential Core.
Keywords: transferable utility games; uncertainty; weak sequential core; bankruptcy games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Stochastic bankruptcy games (2013) 
Working Paper: Stochastic bankruptcy games (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:1205
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