Bounds on Malapportionment

László Kóczy () and Balázs Sziklai

No 1801, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: Uniformly sized constituencies give voters similar influence on election outcomes. When constituencies are set up, seats are allocated to the administrative units, such as states or counties, using apportionment methods. According to the impossibility result of Balinski and Young, none of the methods satisfying basic monotonicity properties assign a rounded proportional number of seats (the Hare-quota). We study the malapportionment of constituencies and provide a simple bound as a function of the house size for an important class of divisor methods, a popular, monotonic family of techniques.

Keywords: apportionment problem; divisor methods; malapportionment; Hare-quota (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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