On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

Ata Atay and Tamás Solymosi

No 1805, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).

Keywords: Bargaining set; core; matching market; assignment game; cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games (2018)
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