Government Green Procurement Spillovers: Evidence from Municipal Building Policies in California

Timothy Simcoe Timothy Simcoe () and Michael Toffel
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Timothy Simcoe Timothy Simcoe: Boston University, School of Management

No 13-030, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We study how government green procurement policies influence private-sector demand for similar products. Specifically, we measure the impact of municipal policies requiring governments to construct green buildings on private-sector adoption of the US Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Using matching methods, panel data, and instrumental variables, we find that government procurement rules produce spillover effects that stimulate both private-sector adoption of the LEED standard and investments in green building expertise by local suppliers. These findings suggest that government procurement policies can accelerate the diffusion of new environmental standards that require coordinated complementary investments by various types of private adopter.

Keywords: Public procurement, green building, quality certification, environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 O33 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2012-09, Revised 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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Journal Article: Government green procurement spillovers: Evidence from municipal building policies in California (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:13-030

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