Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices

Christine L. Exley () and Jeffrey Naecker
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Christine L. Exley: Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit

No 16-064, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one's future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time-inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates.

Keywords: field experiment; commitment; signaling; time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2015-09, Revised 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices (2017)
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