Crime Networks with Bargaining and Build Frictions

Bryan Engelhardt

No 813, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: How does the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect a network when criminal retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities? Given the illicit nature of crime, I analyze a non-competitive market where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions and increase market activity or crime. As an application, the model provides a new perspective on why the U.S. cocaine market saw rising consumption after the introduction of the “War on Drugs.”

Keywords: crime; networks; search; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 K42 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law, nep-net and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hcx:wpaper:0813

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