Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents
Joshua Congdon-Hohman and
Jonathan Lanning ()
Additional contact information
Jonathan Lanning: Department of Economics, Bryn Mawr
No 1304, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This study examines ways in which workers respond to implicit incentives. Specifically, we examine the extent to which workers shift their effort to activities that are measured and which have been previously rewarded in the labor market. To examine this question, we examine the changes in the performance measures of professional baseball players in the season prior to the opportunity to freely negotiate their contract (free agency). We will examine different eras in baseball to examine if we can identify changes in behavior in this pivotal year based on changes to the current premium outputs for each time period.
Keywords: Agency theory; strategic performance; opportunistic behavior; baseball (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J31 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm, nep-lab, nep-lma and nep-spo
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Citations:
Published in Journal of Sports Economics, Volume 19, Number 7, October 2018, Pages 1046-1061.
Downloads: (external link)
https://hcapps.holycross.edu/hcs/RePEc/hcx/HC1304-Congdon-Lanning_FreeAgents.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Beyond Moneyball (2018) 
Working Paper: Workers' Responses to Incentives: The Case of Pending MLB Free Agents (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1304
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