The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory

Charles Anderton

No 1407, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway.

Keywords: Terrorism; Terrorism; Genocide; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gro, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Published in The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Volume 10, Number 2, 2015, Pages 5-20.

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https://hcapps.holycross.edu/hcs/RePEc/hcx/HC1407- ... lutionofGenocide.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The social evolution of genocide across time and geographic space: Perspectives from evolutionary game theory (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hcx:wpaper:1407

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