Sovereign Debt and Supersanctions in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Four Southeast European Countries, 1878-1913

Andreea-Alexandra Maerean, Maja Pedersen and Paul Sharp
Additional contact information
Andreea-Alexandra Maerean: European Commission (DG Economic and Financial Affairs)
Maja Pedersen: University of Southern Denmark

No 216, Working Papers from European Historical Economics Society (EHES)

Abstract: Do emerging markets need to sacrifice economic sovereignty in order to borrow more cheaply on the international capital markets? To explore this, we exploit a natural experiment following the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 when four Balkan states - Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Serbia - received full or de facto independence. Using a novel dataset of monthly bond prices from the Berlin and London stock exchanges, we find that a sacrifice of national sovereignty or ‘supersanctions’ was one way for these emerging markets to receive more favourable borrowing conditions. Romania never submitted to such measures, however, but was usually able to borrow more cheaply than her neighbours.

Keywords: Bulgaria; creditworthiness; emerging markets; Greece; Romania; Serbia; sovereign debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E4 E5 G1 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-his, nep-mac, nep-opm and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ehes.org/wp/EHES_216.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hes:wpaper:0216

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from European Historical Economics Society (EHES) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Sharp ().