Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes

Søren Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos () and Guttorm Schjelderup

No 10-2005, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.

Keywords: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions; taxes; MNEs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2005-09-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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