Developing Hydrogen Infrastructure and Demand: An Evolutionary Game and the Case of China
Tian Zhao,
Zhixin Liu and
Tooraj Jamasb
Additional contact information
Tian Zhao: School of Economics and Management, Beihang University
Zhixin Liu: School of Economics and Management, Beihang University
No 18-2021, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Diffusion of hydrogen refueling stations (HRS) is key to promotion of hydrogen vehicles. In this paper, we explore the nexus between critical stakeholders in the hydrogen industry from a game perspective. We investigate the proposed policy for promotion of hydrogen vehicles in China. We model the three main actors in hydrogen infrastructure development, i.e. public sectors, private investors, and consumers. The tripartite evolutionary game analyzes the interactive policy process of subsidy provision, infrastructure investment, and fuel consumption. We then examine the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the system. We propose a policy mechanism for how to set values of key parameters to promote active cooperation of the three actors in HRS diffusion. A numerical simulation validates the solution of the game and sensitivity analyses of initial probabilities and key parameters. We find that boosting initial willingness of actors to choose cooperative hydrogen strategies is beneficial to lead the game system to the ideal consequence. We offer some recommendations including establishing regulation standards for the construction of HRS, increasing financial incentives to each actor and decreasing the cost of HRS and retail price of hydrogen.
Keywords: Hydrogen infrastructure; Evolutionary game; Numerical simulation; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q42 Q48 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2021-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10398/69861910-f5fd-4001-b77f-5500429bfd0b Full text (application/pdf)
Full text not avaiable
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2021_018
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16 A. 1.floor, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CBS Library Research Registration Team ().