Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet

Elias Tsakas ()

No 254, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the population to agree not to bet.

Keywords: Gamble; private information; communication; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D84 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2007-06-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm
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