Output and Abatement Effects of Allocation Readjustment in Permit Trade

Adrian Muller () and Thomas Sterner
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Thomas Sterner: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Department of Economics., School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG

No 413, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: In permit trading systems, free initial allocation is common practice. A recent example is the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). We investigate effects of different free allocation schemes on incentives and identify significant perverse effects on abatement and output employing a simple multi-period model. Firms have incentives for strategic action if allocation in one period depends on their actions in previous ones and thus can be influenced by them. These findings play a major role where trading schemes become increasingly popular as environmental or resource use policy instruments. This is of particular relevance in the EU-ETS, where the current period is a trial-period before the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol. Finally, this paper fills a gap in the literature by establishing a consistent terminology for initial allocation.

Keywords: - (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D78 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2009-12-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ene and nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/21519 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Output and Abatement Effects of Allocation Readjustment in Permit Trade (2006)
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