Is Fairness Blind? - The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules

Fredrik Carlsson, Mitesh Kataria (mitesh.kataria@economics.gu.se), Elina Lampi, Åsa Löfgren and Thomas Sterner

No 437, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: By using a choice experiment, this paper focuses on citizens’ preferences for effort-sharing rules of how carbon abatement should be shared among countries. We find that Swedes do not rank the rule favoring their own country highest. Instead, they prefer the rule where all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per person, a rule that favors Africa at the expense of high emitters such as the U.S. The least preferred rule is reduction proportional to historical emissions. Using two different treatments, one where the respondents were informed about the country names and one where the country names were replaced with anonymous labels A-D, we also test whether people’s preferences for effort-sharing rules depend on the framing of the problem. We find that while the ranking of the principles is the same in both treatments, the strength of the preferences is significantly increased when the actual names of the countries are used.

Keywords: climate change; fairness; framing; ethics; effort-sharing rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2010-03-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/22176 (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Is fairness blind?--The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules (2011)
Working Paper: Is Fairness Blind? - The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0437

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
jessica.oscarsson@economics.gu.se

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jessica Oscarsson (jessica.oscarsson@economics.gu.se).