Targeted Enforcement and Aggregate Emissions With Uniform Emission Taxes

Jessica Coria and Clara Villegas-Palacio

No 455, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: In practice, targeted monitoring seems to be a strategy frequently used by regulators. In this paper, we study the effects of targeted monitoring strategies on the adoption of a new abatement technology and, consequently, on the aggregate emissions level when firms are regulated with uniform taxes. The results suggest that a regulator aiming to stimulate technology adoption should decrease the adopters’ monitoring probability and/or increase the non-adopters’ monitoring probability. In contrast to previous literature, we find that, in some cases, a regulator whose objective is to minimize aggregate emissions should exert a stronger monitoring pressure on firms with higher abatement costs.

Keywords: technology adoption; environmental policy; imperfect compliance; targeted enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K31 K42 L51 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2010-07-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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