Institution building with limited resources: Establishing a supreme audit institution in Rwanda

Ann-Sofie Isaksson and Arne Bigsten ()

No 481, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: This study is about institution building with limited resources. Through a case study of the establishment of a supreme audit institution (SAI) in Rwanda, we examine the tensions between institutional first-best benchmarks and local operational constraints in a developing country institution-building process. More specifically, our aim is to investigate the potential tradeoffs between the programmatic ideal of SAI independence and operational constraints in terms of staff capacity in the development of a supreme audit oversight function in Rwanda. Drawing on data from document studies and key informant interviews, the empirical results suggest that capacity constraints – within the institution as well as among its major stakeholders – negatively affect important aspects of SAI functional independence, but also that there are arguments for compromising the programmatic ideal of SAI independence in order to effectively tackle operational constraints in terms of staff capacity.

Keywords: Institution building; Capacity constraints; Supreme audit institution; Rwanda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 H83 O16 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2011-01-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-dev
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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/24122 (text/html)

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Journal Article: Institution Building with Limited Resources: Establishing a Supreme Audit Institution in Rwanda (2012)
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