Do Microloan Officers Want to Lend to the Less Advantaged? Evidence from a Choice Experiment

Moïse Sagamba (), Oleg Shchetinin () and Nurmukhammad Yusupov
Additional contact information
Moïse Sagamba: Université Lumiére de Bujumbura and Université de Bretagne Occidentale
Oleg Shchetinin: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG

No 492, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: The mission of microfinance is generally perceived as compensation for the failure of the mainstream financial institutions to deliver access to finance to the poor. Microloan officers have significant influence on microloans allocation as they contact loan applicants and process information inside microfinance institutions (MFIs). We conduct a choice experiment with microloan officers in Burundi to determine which clients are preferred for microloan allocation and whether the less advantaged are indeed targeted. The results suggest that the allocation of microloans is slightly in favor of the less advantaged, whereas the main determinant is the quality of the applicants' business projects. Somewhat surprisingly, we find only small differences in the determinants of the targeted groups between non-profit and profit-seeking MFIs.

Keywords: microfinance; choice experiment; microloan officers; non-profit organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C83 C93 G21 L31 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2011-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-hme and nep-mfd
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Journal Article: Do Microloan Officers Want to Lend to the Less Advantaged? Evidence from a Choice Experiment (2013)
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