Why Unions Reduce Wage Inequality, I - A Theory of Domino Effects
Johan Stennek ()
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Johan Stennek: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O.Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
No 539, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences. But surprisingly few attempts have been made to understand why. Swedish unions reveal that the reason is both ideological and strategic. Relying on employers to voluntarily increase higher wages, to protect efficiency-enhancing wage-differences, unions can focus on increasing the lowest wages without sacrificing higher wages. Since all workers gain, egalitarian wage policies promote unity among workers with different productivity. I formalize these ideas and draw implications for the current debate on capping collectively negotiated minimum wages in Europe. The model combines wage bargaining, efficiency wages, internal union politics and coalition formation.
Keywords: inequality; wage differences; minimum wages; trade unions; collective negotiations; strategic commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2012-09, Revised 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-lma
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0539
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