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Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance

Pieter Gautier, Arjen Siegmann and Aico van Vuuren

No 692, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Do higher real-estate agent fees imply better performance? This study uses a nation-wide dataset of residential real-estate transactions in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2011 to provide evidence against this. Brokers with a flat-fee structure who charge an up-front fee (which is substantially lower than the average fee of traditional brokers) and leave the viewings to the seller sell faster and at - on average - 2.7 percent higher prices. We correct for fixed house- and time effects. We provide additional evidence that the price difference is not due to a seller-selection effect.

Keywords: real-estate brokers; broker incentives; housing; agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 L10 L80 R20 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/51580 (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Real-estate agent commission structure and sales performance (2023) Downloads
Working Paper: Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Real-Estate Agent Commission Structure and Sales Performance (2017) Downloads
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