Tax Evasion with a Conscience

Martin Dufwenberg and Katarina Nordblom ()

No 738, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: How do moral concerns affect tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring an inspection game, modified to incorporate belief-dependent taxpayer guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the authority's more than the citizen's) and regarding policy, in particular fines vs. jail, the role of information campaigns, and the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.

Keywords: tax evasion; guilt; inspection game; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 H26 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/57486 Full text (text/html)

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Journal Article: Tax evasion with a conscience (2022)
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