Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Political Affiliation, and Group Size

Ronja Helénsdotter ()
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Ronja Helénsdotter: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: P.O. Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG, Sweden, https://economics.gu.se/

No 765, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to strengthen the knowledge about the relationship be-tween cooperation and political affiliation. For this purpose, I carry out an incentivized N-person prisoner’s dilemma experiment. I find that left-wing voters cooperate more than right-wing voters in 3-person prisoner’s dilemmas. However, this difference in cooperation tapers off with group size due to a heterogeneous response to larger decision groups. While leftists cooperate less as the group size increases, I find no significant group size effect for rightists. These findings can partly be explained by differences in beliefs about the cooperativeness of others, but a substantial part remains unexplained.

Keywords: Cooperation; Social dilemma; Political ideology; Group size; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C90 D70 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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