A Fresh Look at Whistleblower Rewards

Giancarlo Spagnolo (giancarlo.spagnolo@hhs.se) and Theo Nyreröd (theo.nyrerod@hotmail.com)
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Giancarlo Spagnolo: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Postal: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Theo Nyreröd: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Postal: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 56, SITE Working Paper Series from Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics

Abstract: Recent years have seen a rapid increase in legislation governing, protecting, and rewarding whistleblowers. Whereas the EU recently enacted a Directive protecting whistleblowers, the US has gone one step further long ago, not only protecting them but also offering substantial monetary rewards for their information. In this paper. we review the evidence for the effectiveness of US whistleblower reward programs and consider some recent novelties. We also consider objections against these programs and local factors in the US that likely contribute to their success. Finally, we voice some concerns over the EU Directive´s ability to achieve its policy objective of enhancing enforcement of Union law.

Keywords: whistleblowers; whistleblower rewards; corporate wrongdoing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K20 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2021-06-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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