Is there an omission effect in prosocial behavior?

Manja Gärtner () and Anna Sandberg ()
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Manja Gärtner: Department of Economics, Postal: Stockholm University, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden, https://sites.google.com/site/manjagaertner/
Anna Sandberg: Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), Postal: Stockholm University, SE-106 91 , Stockholm, Sweden, https://sites.google.com/site/annahsandberg/

No 2014:1, SSE Working Paper Series in Economics from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We investigate whether individuals are more prone to act selfishly if they can passively allow for an outcome to be implemented (omission) rather than having to make an active choice (commission). In most settings, active and passive choice alternatives differ in terms of factors such as the presence of a suggested option, costs of taking an action, and awareness. We isolate the omission effect from confounding factors in two experiments, and find no evidence that the distinction between active and passive choices has an independent effect on the propensity to implement selfish outcomes. This suggests that increased selfishness through omission, as observed in various economic choice situations, is driven by other factors than a preference for selfish omissions.

Keywords: Fairness; Social preferences; Morals; Dictator game; Omission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2014-09-24, Revised 2015-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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