Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games

Zibo Xu ()
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Zibo Xu: Dept. of Economic Statistics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden, https://sites.google.com/site/ziboxu/

No 745, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We prove that, in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect information, a continuous-time best response dynamic always converges to a Nash equilibrium component. We show the robustness of convergence by an approximate best response dynamic: whatever the initial state and an allowed approximate best response dynamic, the state is close to the set of Nash equilibria most of the time. In a perfect-information game where each player can only move at one node, we prove that all interior approximate best response dynamics converge to the backward induction equilibrium, which is hence the socially stable strategy in the game.

Keywords: Convergence to Nash equilibrium; games in extensive form; games of perfect information; Nash equilibrium components; best response dynamics; fictitious play; socially stable strategy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2013-06-24, Revised 2013-06-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Note: The author would like to acknowledge financial support from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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