Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?

Sven-Olov Daunfeldt, Jörgen Hellström () and Mats Landström ()
Additional contact information
Jörgen Hellström: Department of Economics, Postal: Umeå University, SE-90187 Umeå, Sweden
Mats Landström: Department of Economics, Postal: University of Gävle, SE-801 76 Gävle, Sweden

No 13, HUI Working Papers from HUI Research

Abstract: It is something of a puzzle that politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their possibilities to fine-tune the economy. In this paper the determinants of central bank independence (CBI) reforms are studied using a new data set on the possible event of such reforms in 119 countries. According to the data, as much as 81 countries had implemented CBI-reforms during the study period. The results indicate, moreover, that policymakers are more likely to delegate power to independent central banks when the foreign debt is relatively high. In non-OECD countries, the likelihood of a CBI-reform also seems to increase when policymakers face a high probability of getting replaced.

Keywords: Central bank independence; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 E61 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2008-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hui.se/LitiumDokument20/GetDocument.asp ... tory=72&document=986 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.hui.se/LitiumDokument20/GetDocument.asp?archive=3&directory=72&document=986 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.hui.se/LitiumDokument20/GetDocument.asp?archive=3&directory=72&document=986 [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://hui.se/LitiumDokument20/GetDocument.asp?archive=3&directory=72&document=986)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms? (2013)
Working Paper: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms? (2009)
Working Paper: Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HUI Working Papers from HUI Research Handelns Forskningsinstitut, c/o HUI Research, Regeringsgatan 60, 103 29 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hans Seerar Westerberg ().