Does Physicians' Compensation Affect the Probability of their Vetoing Generic Substitution?

David Granlund ()
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David Granlund: Department of Economics, Postal: Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden, and the Swedish Retail Institute (HUI), Regeringsgatan 60, SE-103 29 Stockholm, Sweden

No 14, HUI Working Papers from HUI Research

Abstract: Physicians' decisions whether or not to veto generic substitution were analyzed using a sample of 350,000 pharmaceutical prescriptions. Point estimates show that - compared to county-empoyed physicians on salary - physicians working at private practices were 50-80% more likely to veto substitution. The results indicate that this difference is explained by the difference in direct cost associated with substitution, rather than by private physicians' possibly stronger incentives to please their patients. Also, the probability of a veto was found to increase as patients' copayments decreased. This might indicate moral hazard in insurance, though other exaplanations are plausible.

Keywords: doctors; salary; fee for service; moral hazard; prescriptions; drugs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 I11 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2008-04-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Granlund, David, 'Are private physicians more likely to veto generic substitution of prescribed pharmaceuticals? ' in Social Science & Medicine, 2009, pages 1643-1650.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0014

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