Screening disability insurance applications

Philip de Jong, Maarten Lindeboom () and Bas van der Klaauw
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Philip de Jong: University of Amsterdam

No 2006:15, Working Paper Series from IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Stricter screening seems to improve targeting efficiency, without inducing negative spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. The costs of stricter screening are only a small fraction of the monetary benefits.

Keywords: Disability insurance; experiment; policy evaluation; sickness absenteeism; self-screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J26 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2006-11-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS (2011)
Working Paper: Screening Disability Insurance Applications (2006)
Working Paper: Screening Disability Insurance Applications (2006)
Working Paper: Screening Disability Insurance Applications (2006)
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