Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform

Laura Larsson and Caroline Runeson ()
Additional contact information
Laura Larsson: SNS - Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, Postal: SNS , Jakobsbergsgatan 18 , Box 5629 , S-114 86 Stockholm, Sweden
Caroline Runeson: Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Postal: Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Caroline Hall

No 2007:8, Working Paper Series from IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy

Abstract: This paper looks at a specific type of moral hazard that arises in the interplay between two large public insurance systems in Sweden, namely the sickness insurance (SI) and the unemployment insurance (UI). Moral hazard can arise from the benefit size structure as for some unemployed persons, benefits from the SI are higher than benefits from the UI. We use a reform of the SI system that came in force 1 July, 2003, to identify the effect of economic incentives arising from the different benefit sizes. Our results from a duration analysis show clearly that the higher the benefits, the larger the probability of reporting sick.

Keywords: Unemployment insurance; sickness insurance; health; duration analysis; discrete hazard models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 H55 I18 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2007-03-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Hartman, Laura and Caroline Hall, 'Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform' in Empirical Economics, 2010, pages 27-50.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2007/wp07-08.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2007/wp07-08.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2007/wp07-08.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2007_008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy IFAU, P O Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ali Ghooloo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).