Immediate Agreement in Interdependent Bilateral Bargaining

Jonas Björnerstedt () and Johan Stennek ()
Additional contact information
Jonas Björnerstedt: Swedish Competition Authority, Postal: SE-103 85 Stockholm, Sweden
Johan Stennek: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

No 692, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are represented by separate agents in all negotiations in which they are involved. There is immediate agreement in equilibrium, essentially if production is strictly convex or if the agents use Markov strategies.

Keywords: Bilateral Oligopoly; Intermediate Goods; Bargaining; Market Network; Trade Link (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D20 D40 L10 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2007-01-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0692

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