Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict

Thomas Tangerås ()

No 751, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.

Keywords: Democracy; Autocracy; War; Maximal Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2008-06-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0751

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