Paying to Remove Advertisements

Joacim Tåg

No 789, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: Media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an advertisement-based product. We formally examine an ad-based monopolist's incentives to introduce this option. When deciding whether to introduce the option to pay, the monopolist compares the potential direct revenues from consumers with lost advertising revenues from not intermediating those consumers to advertisers. If the option is introduced, the media firm increases advertising quantity to make the option to pay more attractive. This hurts consumers, but benefits the media firm and advertisers. Total welfare may increase or decrease. Perhaps surprisingly, more annoying advertisements may lead to an increase in advertising quantity.

Keywords: Advertising; Damaged goods; Media markets; Price discrimination; Two-sided markets; Vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L15 L59 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2009-02-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Information Economics and Policy, 2009, pages 245-252.

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Journal Article: Paying to remove advertisements (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0789

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