Generosity and Political Preferences

Christopher T. Dawes, Magnus Johannesson, Erik Lindqvist, Peter Loewen, Robert Östling, Marianne Bonde and Frida Priks
Additional contact information
Christopher T. Dawes: Department of Politics, Postal: New York University
Peter Loewen: Department of Political Science, Postal: University of Toronto-Mississauga, Ontario, Canada

No 941, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards co-partisans in all countries, and that this effect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education.

Keywords: Generosity; Altruism; Political Preferences; Size of Government; Public Goods; Dictator Game; Ingroup Effect; Political Partisanship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2012-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-eur, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0941

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