Attention Manipulation and Information Overload

Petra Persson

No 995, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: When a decision-maker’s attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker’s attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker’s knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.

Keywords: Communication; Information Overload; Limited Attention; Persuasion; Disclosure; Complexity; Consumer Protection; Salience (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D82 D83 M38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2013-12-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Attention manipulation and information overload (2018)
Working Paper: Attention Manipulation and Information Overload (2017)
Working Paper: Attention Manipulation and Information Overload (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0995

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