Mine, Ours or Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games

Andreas Bergh and Philipp Wichardt

No 1205, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. As was shown by Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), inducing a feeling of entitlement – one subject earning the endowment – strongly affects allocations in dictator games towards the owner of the money (both dictator and receiver). The present results show that seemingly small differences in instructions induce fundamentally different perceptions regarding entitlement. Behavior is affected accordingly, i.e. instructions inducing subjects to perceive the task as distributive rather than a task of generosity lead to higher allocations to receivers (average 52% vs. 35%). A theoretical explanation integrating monetary as well as social incentives and emphasizing potential effects of uncertainty about the latter is discussed (cf. Bergh and Wichardt, 2018).

Keywords: Dictator games; Framing effects; Property rights; Social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2018-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Mine, Ours or Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1205

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