Efficiency Gains and Time-savings of Permanent Panels in the WTO Dispute Settlement

Louise Johannesson

No 1219, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: The dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is today the most active dispute resolution forum in the world. However, its success has also led to increased processing time of disputes, which, in turn, increases the cost of using the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a way to resolve trade conflicts. I investigate whether the DSM can be improved by introducing a permanent panel of judges, to replace the current ad hoc system of appointing new judges for each dispute. I find mixed results, but one aspect that could speed up the process is that permanent judges develop established work relations and working methods.

Keywords: WTO; Dispute settlement; WTO panel; Trade disputes; Delays (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2018-06-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1219

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