Coups, Regime Transition, and the Dynamics of Press Freedom

Christian Bjørnskov, Andreas Freytag () and Jerg Gutmann

No 1225, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the dynamics of press freedom around events that threaten or oust the incumbent regime of a country. While democracies on average grant the press more freedom, our theoretical starting point is that democracies and autocracies may have similar incentives to protect the power of the governing regime. A priori it is, nevertheless, not clear whether democracies or autocracies react more harshly – by silencing or controlling the media – to an attempt to overthrow the government. We estimate the dynamics of press freedom around both failed and successful coups and find that although press freedom is quite stable, successful coups lead to a substantial reduction in press freedom. This is, however, only the case when the coup is directed against a democratically elected government.​

Keywords: Coup; Political instability; Press freedom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H12 L51 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2018-08-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coups and the dynamics of media freedom (2022)
Working Paper: Coups, Regime Transition, and the Dynamics of Press Freedom (2018)
Working Paper: Coups, Regime Transition, and the Dynamics of Press Freedom (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1225

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