Multi-Unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-Unit Demand

Edward Anderson and Pär Holmberg
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Edward Anderson: University of Sydney Business School, Australia, and Imperial College Business School

No 1460, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price floor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.

Keywords: Multi-unit auction; Single-unit demand; Uniform pricing; Pay-as-bid; Asymmetric information; Publicity effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 2023-05-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand (2023)
Working Paper: Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand (2023)
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