Detection Biases in Bluffing - Theory and Experiments

Hakan Holm

No 2004:30, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: People may be better at recognizing lies than truths or better at recognizing truths than lies. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically and experimentally. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which, the better a player is to detect lies the more often will the opponent player lie. In the experiment, subjects were telling the truth too often according to standard predictions. Other findings were a significant positive correlation between self-rated bluffing ability and actual bluffing performance. Furthermore, the subjects were more prone to lie to a woman than to a man.

Keywords: Bluffing; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie detection; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2004-12-22, Revised 2005-01-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Note: This working paper has been divided into two and replaced by 2008:4 and 2008:5
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2004_030

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