Nonlinear Taxation and Punishment

Tommy Andersson

No 2005:41, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n>=3 differing individuals. We demonstrate that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self-selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight.

Keywords: Nonlinear taxation; Pareto efficiency; self-selection; welfare weights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2005-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, pages 49-58.

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Journal Article: Nonlinear taxation and punishment (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_041

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